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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DELL CHRYST,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20020738-CA
vs.
HANS BRAUN, KATHY GOULD, and
WELTMEISTER, INC.,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a directed verdict entered against Appellant, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did appellant properly preserve his claims in the trial court?
Standard of Review: Where an appellant has not raised his claims in the trial
court, nor "argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal... [an appellate
court] need not reach [his claim]." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App.
1995).

Issue No. 2: Did the trial deny appellant's due process right by not allowing any
party to give opening statements at bench trial?
Standard of Review: Questions involving due process analysis are reviewed
under a "correctness standard, which incorporates a clearly erroneous standard for review
of subsidiary factual determinations." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n. 3 (Utah
1991).
Issue No. 3: Is Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) unconstitutional where it was
clearly drafted to protect consumers and prospective employers from bad or unqualified
employees?
Standard of Review: "The issue of '[w]hether a statute is constitutional is a
question of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court.5"
Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, \ 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced in
Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7;
Utah Const, art. XII, § 19;
Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 5, 2003, Appellant Dell Chryst ("Chryst") filed a verified Complaint
against Weltmeister, Inc. ("Weltmeister") and two of its employees, Hans Braun
("Braun") and Kathy Gould ("Gould"). R. 1-9. In his Complaint Chryst alleged that
2

Appellees, his former employers, committed the tort of slander and defamation against
Chryst. See id. Further, admitting that the standard of review in the trial court was
"clear and convincing evidence," Chryst alleged that because Appellees5 statements
about him were false and made with actual malice, Appellees were not entitled to the
good faith immunity and presumption afforded under Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001).
See id. Appellees filed an Answer to the Complaint on August 19, 2003, asserting
immunity as former employers under section 34-42-1. R. 15-19.
A bench trial was held on December 13, 2004. R. 67, 112. Following Chryst's
presentation of evidence, Appellees made a motion for directed verdict. R. 67, 112:14549. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing Chryst's case with prejudice. R. 67,
112:149-52. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order were entered on
January 27, 2005. R. 82-86. Chryst timely filed a Notice of Appeal on February 23,
2005. R. 89-90.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
After processing Chryst's employment application and following an extensive
background check conducted by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), the
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), determined that
Chiyst was not suitable for employment as an Immigrations Inspector. Plaintiffs Exhibit
("P. Ex.") 17. In a "show cause" letter dated on December 18, 2002, the INS detailed
Chryst's misconduct or negligence in employment and his criminal or dishonest conduct
1

The Facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. See State v.
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
3

as the reasons for his non-hire. Id. Relying on that document, the trial court found that
Chryst failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements about Chryst
which were provided to OPM by Braun and Gould, were the cause of his non-hire. See
R. 83-88.
"k "k "k

In March 2000, Weltmeister employed Chryst as a sales representative on a sales
commission basis. R. 83-88, 112:10. Braun, a supervisor and Vice President of
Weltmeister, hired Chryst. R. 112:7-8, 13. At that time, Chryst signed an employment
agreement with Weltmeister. R. 112:9-10, 12-13, 120-21. Under the terms of that
employment agreement, Chryst agreed not to "divulge any business information . . .
including] . . . financial data . . . [and] sales data[.]" P. Ex. 1.
Chryst became a higher paid fully salaried employee with no part of his salary to
be derived from sales in July 2000. R. 83-88; P. Ex. 15 at 33. The reason for the
increased salary was that Chryst agreed to work on an application for Weltmeister to
become a publicly traded company. R. 112:13-15, 55-58; P. Ex. 15 at 33. Chryst was to
spend the next three to four months working on only this application. Id. Chryst's
employment with Weltmeister ended on or about July 31, 2001 under unfavorable
circumstances. R. 83-88, 112:15-16; P. Ex. 15 at 35.
During his employment with Weltmeister, Braun observed that after Chryst was
placed on full salary his sales productivity fell to nothing. P. Ex. 15 at 33. Further,
despite the three to four months that Chryst was supposed to have been working on the
4

application, Chryst failed to provide Braun with even a partially finished application. P.
Ex. 15 at 33. When Chryst ended his employment with Weltmeister, he took all of his
work files with him. P. Ex. 15 at 33. After Braun made a demand that he return those
files, Chryst returned only four to five manila folders revealing the minimal work that
Chryst had done over the last year and a half. R. 112:60-61; P. Ex. 15 at 33. Chryst was
often observed spending a tremendous amount of personal time on the telephone and
computer while at work. R. 112:124-25; P. Ex. 15 at 34, 36. Chryst would also leave
work early when Braun was out of town and took unauthorized and unearned vacation
time. R. 112:120-23; P. Ex. 15 at 36.
Around the time he left Weltmeister, Chryst contacted the President of the
company in Germany by email and informed him that Braun was embezzling money
from the company and running the company into the ground. P. Ex. 15 at 34. The email
further stated that Chryst sought Braun5 s position of Vice President. Id. Finally, in direct
violation of the terms of his employment agreement, while working at Weltmeister
Chryst contacted a mutual friend, Bruce Hall, and disclosed information regarding the
company's finances and that Weltmeister was going under because Braun was bleeding
money from the business. Id. Later, when he was interviewed by OPM, Mr. Hall
confirmed Chryst's violations of his employment agreement. See P. Ex. 15 at 40-41.
Following his employment with Weltmeister, Chryst unsuccessfully sought
employment with IHC, the American Red Cross, several brokerage houses, City and
State government and with private individuals. R. 112:48. In August 2002 Chryst
5

applied for employment with the INS. R. 112:48-49. As part of that hiring process,
OPM conducted a background investigation on Chryst, interviewing Chryst, Braun,
Gould, Mr. Hall and others to collect information about Chryst. R. 112:49; P. Ex. 15 at
28-43.
Throughout the course of its investigation, OPM discovered that three of the
employees of Chryst5s former employer, Interstate Brands, refused to be interviewed due
to unfavorable circumstances in which Chryst left that job, fearing that Chryst would sue
them. R. 112:92-93. Chryst also sued Mr. and Ms. Hall and Interstate Brands, alleging
that they are the cause of his failure to obtain employment with the INS. R. 112:88.
On his application form ("SF 86") submitted to OPM, under oath Chryst was
instructed to provide information regarding his employment for the last seven years. R.
112:96; P. Ex. 15 at 13. However, Chryst failed to list his self-employment with Mass
Mutual, his employment with SOS Staffing and his employment with Juab School
District. R. 112:93-101, 103-04; P. Ex. 15 at 13-14, 55-59. Additionally, Chryst reported
that he had received an Associate Degree from LDS Business College. R. 112:125.
However, OPM discovered that this was not true—Chryst had not applied for graduation.
Id, Despite having a second opportunity during his interview with OPM to correct or add
that information on his SF 86, Chryst failed to do so. R. 112:101. Chryst certified by
signature the SF 86, Declaration for Federal Employment, which states that his answers
were true and correct and that false or fraudulent answers to any questions may be
grounds for non-hire. R. 112:102-03; P. Ex. 15 at 24.
6

OPM also discovered that Chryst had filed three unemployment claims since 1994.
R. 112:104. Prior to receiving unemployment benefits, Chryst had received a pamphlet
from the State of Utah, Department of Workforce Services, containing instructions on
reporting wages paid during periods of unemployment. R. 112:104-07; P. Ex. 15 at 5455. The pamphlet stated that it was illegal and fraudulent to receive unemployment
benefits while not reporting wages paid during that time. R. 112:106-07, 109; P. Ex. 15
at 54-55. Despite those express instructions from the Department of Workforce Services,
OPM found that Chryst had failed to report substantial wages he had earned on two
separate occasions while receiving unemployment benefits. R. 112:106-12; P. Ex. 15 at
54.
Based on OPM's investigative findings, the INS issued a show cause letter to
Chryst dated December 18, 2002. R. 112:77-79, 129; P. Ex. 17. In that letter, the INS
described the two charges or reasons why Chryst was being denied employment. Id. The
first charge is labeled "Misconduct and Negligence in Employment." P. Ex. 17. It
restates Chryst's misconduct and negligence based on negative information about
Chryst's poor performance with Weltmeister, as primarily provided to OPM by Braun
and Gould. Compare P. Ex. 17 with P. Ex. 15 at 32-36. However, the second charge
entitled "Criminal or Dishonest Conduct[,]" is based solely on negative information
obtained from Chryst's wage data and unemployment history sources. R. 112:111-12,

7

129; P. Ex. 17. The INS states in its letter that each of the two charges is a basis for
disqualification from employment. P. Ex. 17.
At bench trial, after the close of Chryst's case Appellees made a motion for
directed verdict, arguing that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) Chryst had
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the statements made by Braun and
Gould were the cause of Chryst's non-hire. R. 112:145-46. Relying on the show cause
letter detailing the INS' reasons for denial of employment, the trial court held that Chryst
had not established by clear and convincing evidence the employer's actual malice or
intent to mislead. R. 112:149-52.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
On appeal, Chryst claims that the trial court denied an alleged due process right to
opening statements at bench trial, and that Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001)
unconstitutionally interferes with his alleged right to work where he wishes. Those
claims fail because they are inadequately briefed, unpreserved, and lacking in merit.
Chryst's arguments wholly fail to comply with the requirements of rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Combined, both of Chryst's arguments consist of two
typewritten pages. Chryst makes no effort to cite portions of the record relied upon and
to cite relevant comprehensible authority to support his claims. The two claims are also
void of any substantive analysis. Additionally, Chryst's statements as to the case and
facts contain no citation to the record and are full of extraneous facts and unfounded

8

emotional remarks. Where Chryst's brief is wholly inadequate, it need not be considered
by this Court.
Chryst's claims also fail in that they were not properly preserved in the trial court.
At bench trial, Chryst's counsel did not object to the trail court's decision to forgo
opening statements by any of the parties to the litigation. Further, Chryst's claim that
section 34-42-1 is unconstitutional was never raised before the trial court. Given
Chryst's failure to properly preserve his claims in the trial court and his failure to argue
exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal, his claims are waived on appeal.
Finally, neither of Chryst's claims have merit. Contrary to Chryst's assertion
otherwise, the trial court's decision to forego opening statements at bench trial was not a
violation of Chryst's due process rights. The due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution
and Utah Constitution only grant an individual his day in court. Where Chryst was
afforded a meaningful opportunity to submit relevant information and persuasive legal
reasoning to the court, he had his day in court. Further, as none of the parties was
allowed to present opening statements, the trial court's decision was not prejudicial to
Chryst.
Likewise, Chryst's assertion that section 34-42-1 unconstitutionally interferes with
his right to work is nonsensical. While the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to
obtain employment when possible, that right is not absolute. Section 34-42-1 offers
protection to former employers who have been asked by a prospective employer about
the former job performance of an applicant. The clear purpose behind the statue is to
9

encourage open and honest disclosure by former employers so that prospective employers
and consumers may avoid the often-devastating affects of bad or unqualified employees.
Thus, section 34-42-1 is constitutional in that it is a reasonable regulation correlated with
the public's general welfare.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE WAS DENIED
DUE PROCESS AND THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 3442-1 (2001) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARE
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, UNPRESERVED AND
LACKING IN MERIT
Although difficult to discern, Chryst essentially raises two claims on appeal: (1)
whether the trial court denied Chryst's due process rights by not allowing opening
statements at bench trial; and (2) whether Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is
unconstitutional. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-7, 9-11. Chryst's claims fail in that they are
inadequately briefed, unpreserved, and wholly lacking in merit.
A.

Appellant's claims are inadequately briefed, and therefore, need not be
considered by this Court.
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are

not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998). The
briefing requirements are found in rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule
24(a)(9) requires that "[t]he argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issues not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts
of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "'[An appellate] court is not a
10

depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research.'" Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, \ 42, 110
P.3d 678 (citations omitted); see also Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, Tf 11, 26 P.3d 212
(Although "some leeway" is granted a pro se litigant, "[An appellate court] will not
assume his '"burden of argument and research."5) (Citations omitted).
In the instant case, Chryst's argument is inadequately briefed. Completely lacking
in substance, Chryst's first argument consists of only one typewritten paragraph, less than
half of a page long, containing only five brief sentences. See Br. of Aplt. at 9-10.
Contrary to the requirements of rule 24(a)(9), that argument is wholly void of any citation
to the record, void of any grounds for reviewing issues not preserved in the trial court,
and void of any comprehensible and authoritative citation to authorities and statutes. See
id. The only alleged authority listed within Chryst's first argument is an obscure
quotation containing an incoherent cite to "75 Am Jur 2d, Trial Sections 192 et seq. [sic]"
Br. of Aplt. at 10. As it stands, that citation fails to satisfy the requirements of rule
24(a)(9), it does not constitute controlling authority in this jurisdiction and it lends no
credence to Chryst's claim that an opening statement is a right of due process. See State
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) ("[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority."); see also Walker v. United States Gem, Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah

2

See also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not
like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.").
11

1996) (declining to address issues when appellant's brief "wholly fail[s] to cite to the
record or a single case in support of this contention").
Similarly, Chryst's second argument consists of three brief paragraphs, amounting
to just over one page of typewritten material. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Cf. State v.
Lucero, 2002 UT App 135,ffl[12-15, 47 P.3d 107 (finding a single-issue argument
consisting of only six pages to be inadequately briefed). Like Chryst's first argument, it
also fails to comply with the requirements of rule 24(a)(9) in that it is wholly lacking in
substance and citation to the record, and also fails to list any grounds for reviewing issues
not preserved in the trial court. See id.; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). While the second
argument contains one reference to the challenged statute, no effort is made to discuss the
trial court's application of that statute or its alleged unconstitutionality. See Br. of Aplt.
at 10. The only other citation, listed as "The U.S. Constitution 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)
[sic]" is apparently a reference to an unidentified ancient United States Supreme Court
case that, as quoted, lends no substantive support to Chryst's claim that a Utah statute is
unconstitutional. See id.; see also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1998) ("'[A]
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority
cited[.]'") (citation omitted, alteration in original).
Additionally, Chryst's Statement of Case and Statement of Facts are insufficient.
Except for an occasional reference to trial exhibits, Chryst's statements are wholly
lacking in citation to the record. See Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. Moreover, both statements are
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inappropriately rife with emotional argument and facts not contained in the record. See
id.
Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the statement of
the case "shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and
its disposition in the court below[,]" and that the statement of facts be "relevant to the
issues presented for review[.]" Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Most importantly, the rule
requires that "[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record[.]" Id. "This court need not, and will not consider
any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'I
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (declining to consider an appellant's factual
allegations were they were either unsupported by the record or not properly cited); see
alsoKoulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App. 1987) (disregarding
sua sponte an appellant's brief where it was "filled with burdensome, emotional,
immaterial and inaccurate argument," and "only a small proportion of authorities cited . .
. b[ore] any resemblance to the propositions for which they [were] cited").
Contrary to the requirements of rule 24(a)(7), Chryst's Statement of the Case is
completely void of any semblance of the procedural nature of the case and of the
disposition of the case. Instead, Chryst inappropriately offers two typewritten pages of
unsupported factual statements and emotional arguments that are generally absent from
the trial transcript. Compare Br. of Aplt. at 6-7 with R. 112. For example, Chryst
improperly offers his conjecture such as "if the court had listened in the case and allowed
13

for due process . . .[,]" and Chryst's emotional arguments such as "this trial was biased
and unfair[,]" and Chryst's unwarranted personal attacks on opposing counsel such as
"[t]his was never an issue with anyone but [opposing counsel] to discredit [Chryst] and
the court was duped by it." Br. of Aplt. at 7. Unfortunately, those are only a few of the
many egregious examples contained in Chryst's brief. See id. at 6-7. Likewise, Chryst's
Statement of Facts contains unsupported and unfounded allegations and argument. See
Br. of Aplt. at 8-9 (accusing Appellee of slander, gossip, malice and of making
"ridiculous accusations" against Chryst). Accordingly, where Chryst fails to comply with
the clear directive offered in rule 24(a)(7), this Court may decline consideration of
Chryst's appeal. See Uckerman, 588 P.2d at 144; Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85.
In sum, Chryst impermissibly treats this Court as " c a depository in which [he]
dump[s] the burden of argument and research.'" Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT 19 at ^f
42 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Chryst's stated facts wrongly lack any citation to the
record and are "filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate
argument[.]" Koulis, 746 P.2d at 1184-85. Accordingly, where Chryst has inadequately
briefed his appeal, this Court need not address it. See Parra, 972 P.2d at 926.
B.

Appellant waived his claims on appeal because he failed to preserve them in
the trial court.
The record clearly reflects that Chryst was represented by counsel at trial. See R.

112:3. However, neither of Chryst's two appellate claims were raised by a timely
objection before the trial court. See record generally. Furthermore, Chryst has not
argued exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal.
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"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1f 11, 10 P.3d 346. "A timely objection provides
the trial court with can opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct
it.5" State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, the
objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error"
complained of. Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah
App. 1996) (citation omitted).
There is no exception to the preservation rule "unless [an appellant] can
demonstrate [on appeal] that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11 (citations omitted); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) ("Th[e] [preservation] rule applies to all claims, including
constitutional questions[.]"). Furthermore, where an appellant has not "argued plain error
or exceptional circumstances on appeal. . . [an appellate court] need not consider his
claim." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995).
Chrysfs first claim that he was denied due process when the trial court dispensed
with opening statements, was unpreserved in the trial court. As the bench trial in this
matter began, after counsel for the parties had made appearances for the record, the judge
informed all parties that he that he had "reviewed the file, and [] will dispense with
opening statements[.]" R. 112:3. The trial judge then informed Chrysfs counsel, David
Holds worth, that he may proceed with his first witness. Id. Without objection, Mr.
Holdsworth stated "[v]ery good, your Honor. Thank you." Id. He then called Chryst to
15

testify. Id. The opening statement issue was not raised again throughout the remainder
of the bench trial SeeR. 112.
The second argument made by Chryst on appeal—that the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard as stated in Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional—is
nowhere to be found in the transcript of the bench trial. See R. 112. To the contrary,
Chryst expressly recognized both in his verified Complaint and during trial that the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard set forth in section 34-42-1 was the appropriate
standard to be applied in this case. See R. 1-9, 112:146-47. Significantly, in responding
to the motion for directed verdict, Mr. Holdsworth stated "[t]he standard, however, is to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the employer—or in this case the former
employer acted with malice, or with intent to mislead." R. 112:146. Even after the trial
court awarded directed verdict in favor of Appellees, Chryst failed to make any objection
to the court's decision. See R. 112:149-52.
On appeal, Chryst fails to argue either exceptional circumstances or plain error.
See Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. As a result, given Chryst's failure to preserve his claims in the
trial court, they have been waived on appeal and should be dismissed. Holgate, 2000 UT
74 at H 11; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 700-01.
C.

Appellant's claims that he was denied his right to due process and that Utah
Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional lack merit.
Irrespective of Chryst's failure to adequately brief his claim and failure to properly

preserve his claims in the trial court, both of Chryst's constitutional claims are frivolous.
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(1)

Where Appellant was given ample opportunity to be heard, the trial
court did not violate his due process rights by forgoing opening
statements at bench trial.

Essentially, Chryst's first claim is that the trial court denied his due process right
by not allowing him to present an opening statement. See Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. Although
in his argument Chryst fails to name what constitutional due process rights are at issue,
under his "Constitutional Provisions" heading Chryst refers to article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
id. Additionally, Chryst offers no analysis differentiating between the two independent
due process clauses and their attendant rights. See id. Irrespective of those deficiencies,
where Chryst was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the bench trial, there
was no violation of his due process rights under either the Utah Constitution or the
United States Constitution.
'"Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the
due process guarantees contained in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment^ to the United States
Constitution.'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1J11 n. 2, 52 P.3d 1158 (citations omitted).
"Therefore, [an] analysis of questions concerning procedural due process under the due
process provisions of the United States and Utah constitutions are also substantially the
same." Id.
"[NJotice and the opportunity to be 'heard' are frequently recited as the essential
elements of due process." Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court ofAppeals, 2005 UT 18, ^ 12,
110 P.3d 706. "Yet, this does not always mean a party's voice must be orally transmitted
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to the ear of a judge." Id. Instead, "a party must simply be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to submit relevant information and persuasive legal reasoning to the court."
Id. "The manner of communication may vary, so long as it is effective to the context of
the adjudication." Id. In short, constitutionally a claimant is only guaranteed his day in
court. See Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, % 38, 44 P.3d 63.
Chryst had his day in court. At trial, Chryst was afforded the meaningful
opportunity to provide relevant witnesses testimony, redirect testimony, documentary
evidence and argument to the judge. See R. 112. Through extensive direct and redirect
testimony, Chryst was personally given an opportunity to explain his claims to the judge.
See R. 112:4-88, 130-38 (92 pages of the 150-page transcript consist of Chryst's direct
and redirect testimony). Chryst's wife was also allowed to testify, giving her version of
the events. See R. 112:139-44. During the course of the bench trial, Chryst submitted
twenty-two multiage evidentiary documents in support of his claim. See R. 80, 112: 488. Finally, Chryst was given ample opportunity to oppose the motion for directed
verdict. See R. 112:146-48. In light of those "meaningful opportunities] to submit
relevant information and persuasive legal reasoning to the court[,]" Chryst's due process
rights were not violated by the trial court's refusal to entertain opening statements.
Perez-Llamas, 2005 UT 18 at f 12; see also Miller, 2002 UT 6 at f 38 ("Th[e]
constitutional right to a day in court is the 'right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to
litigate a claim, seek relief, or defend one's rights.'") (citing Black's Law Dictionaiy, 402
(7th ed. 1999)).
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Additionally, the trial court's denial of all parties' opening statements is harmless.
Just prior to dispensing with opening statements, the judge stated that he had "reviewed
the file[.]" R. 112:3. That statement infers that the judge was already well apprised of
Chryst's claims, and that he was ready to hear the evidence. It is well known that the
information provided in an opening statement is not evidentiary in nature; it is only a
snap shot of what the evidence will show. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah
1982) ("The purpose of an opening statement is to apprise the [judge] of what [facts]
counsel intends to prove[;] . . . [i]t is generally accepted that an opening statement should
not be argumentative."). Therefore, where the judge was already well aware of Chryst's
claims there was no harm in dispensing with opening statements. The case was not so
complicated that an opening statement would have been imperative. See State v. Harry,
873 P.2d 1149, 1154 (Utah App. 1994). Indeed, Chryst's Complaint consists of only one
claim.
In any event, assuming arguendo that that the court's decision to forgo opening
statements was harmful, where no party was afforded the opportunity to give an opening
statement, any possible harm was shared by all parties, not just by Chryst. Accordingly,
at trial Chryst was treated the same as the Appellees, and no harm could have resulted
from that equal treatment.
More importantly, Chryst fails to cite any authority for the proposition that failure
to make an opening statement is prejudicial, and actually, Utah case law suggests the
opposite. In State v. Harry, this Court held that "[e]ven if we did determine that that trial
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counsel forgot to deliver an opening statement, we would still conclude that such failure
did not prejudice [his client]." Id. Although Harry dealt with counsel's decision not to
give an opening statement, the lack of weight afforded an opening statement is clear from
that case. See id. Thus, the trial court's decision to forgo opening statements was not
incorrect and did not prejudice Chryst in the litigation of his claims.
(2)

Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 is constitutional in that it was reasonably
drafted to protect consumers and prospective employers from bad or
unqualified employees.

Next, Chryst asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001) is unconstitutional as
applied by the trial court. See Br. of Aplt. at 10-11. Although his claim is disjointed,
essentially Chryst is asserting that the trial court's application of section 34-42-1
impermissibly interfered with his alleged constitutional right to work where he wishes.
See id. Further, Chryst alleges that Appellees, as former employers, were allowed to
"hid[e] behind the intent[] of [] section [34-42-1]" and "hamper civil rights[.]" See id. at
10. Chryst fails to acknowledge, however, that the trial court found that he was factually
the cause of his failure to obtain employment with the INS. His failure to take
responsibility for his immoral, dishonest and illegal actions fatally undercuts Chryst's
constitutional claim. Moreover, section 34-42-1 was clearly drafted to protect consumers
and prospective employers from bad or unqualified employees, and therefore, is
reasonably consistent with the common good of the public and constitutional.
In determining whether a statute is constitutional, the Utah Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that the challenged statute is presumed constitutional, and any
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reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Tindley v. Salt Lake
City Sch. DisL, 2005 UT 30, Tf 11, 526 Utah Adv. Rep. 19; Anderson v. United Parcel
Serv., 2004 UT 57, If 7, 96 P.3d 903. "The issue of '[wjhether a statute is constitutional
is a question of law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court.'" Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ^ 6, 52 P.3d
1148 (citation omitted).
Article XII, section 19 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[e]very person in
this State shall be free to obtain employment whenever possible." Consistent with that
provision, section 34-42-1 provides that "an employer who in good faith provides
information about the job performance, professional conduct, or evaluation of a former . .
. employee to a prospective employer of that employee, may not be held civilly liable for
the disclosure or the consequences of providing information." Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1
(2001). Further, section 34-42-1 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the employer
is acting in good faith unless there is showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
employer disclosed the information with actual malice as defined in the statute. See id.
Contrary to Chryst's assertion otherwise, nothing in the language of section 34-421 prevents him from soliciting employment opportunities. See id. In fact, the statute
contains no requirement that a prospective employer is required to speak to the job
applicant's former employer about his or her prior job performance. Whether a
prospective employer decides to speak with a job applicant's former employer is left to
the prospective employer's discretion. The statute only encourages honesty by former
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employers when that contact is made. Accordingly, where Chryst's freedom to obtain
employment is not impinged by the language of section 34-42-1, it must be presumed
constitutional. See Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at 1 1 1 .
Furthermore, Chryst forgets that his constitutional right to obtain employment is
not absolute—Chryst is only entitled to obtain employment "whenever possible." Utah
Const, art XII, § 19. Long ago, in State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952), while
examining article XII, section 19 of the Utah Constitution, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the constitutional right to obtain employment is limited by "reasonable regulations
correlated with the general welfare." Id. at 563. The High Court held that those
reasonable limitations include "the qualifications prerequisite to engaging in the
professions, trades and many occupations; the regulation of hours, wages, safety and
other controls necessary for the common good." Id.
The language of section 34-42-1 indicates that it was reasonably designed for the
purpose of protecting the public, including prospective employers, from the affects of bad
or unqualified employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (2001). This purpose is
reasonably necessary for the common good of the work force of the State of Utah and for
consumers. See Packard, 250 P.2d at 563. Notwithstanding the excessive litigation and
unemployment costs often associated with termination of a bad or unqualified employee,
in the State of Utah, the overall financial costs of training and/or remedying the mistakes
of unqualified or bad employees likely exceeds millions of dollars. Significantly, a
mistake by a bad or unqualified employee may, in some instances, cost the life of an
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innocent consumer. It is this problem that section 34-42-1 was clearly designed to
remedy. Without the protections of that statute, when questioned by a prospective
employer a former employer would either decline comment or issue false praises
regarding a former employee's poor performance. Thus, section 34-42-1 is constitutional
in that it is a "reasonable regulation[] correlated with the general welfare." Id.
In reality, however, Chryst was his own bar to employment with the INS.
Chryst's acts of deceitfully hiding employment activities (even when given a second
chance to correct that information), of fraudulently collecting unemployment benefits
while receiving unreported wages on two different occasions, of breaching an agreement
by revealing confidential company information, of stealing company files, of spending
company time on the telephone and computer for personal reasons, of maligning a
supervisor to the company president, of negligently failing to achieve work objectives,
and of dishonestly taking unauthorized vacation days and pay, were the reasons for his
non-hire with the INS. See P. Ex. 17. In short, given his improprieties Chryst's
employment with the INS was never a possibility. See Utah Const, art XII, § 19 ("Every
person in this State shall be free to obtain employment wheneverpossible[.]") (emphasis
added).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees request that the judgment of the trial court be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7

day of August 2005.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

tah Code Section Article I, Section 7

Page 1 of 1

Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
:> History for Constitution
Dwnload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_02008.zrP 1,567 Bytes
ictjoTis in this Chapter]Chapters in this TitlejAU Titles[Legislative Home Page
t revised: Monday, May 16, 2005

ah Code Section Article XII, Section 19

Page 1 of 1

Article XII, Section 19. [Blacklisting forbidden.]
Each person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever possible, and a person or
rporation, or their agent, servant, or employee may not maliciously interfere with any person from
tabling employment or enjoying employment already obtained from any other person or corporation.
) History for Constitution
)wnload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_0D005.ZIP 1,717 Bytes
ctions in this Chapter|Chapters in this TitlejAU TitleslLegislative Home Page
f revised: Monday, May 16, 2005

tah Code Section 34-42-1

Page i of 1

34-42-1. Employer references - Civil liability — Rebuttable presumption - Common law.
(1) An employer who in good faith provides information about the job performance, professional
nduct, or evaluation of a former or current employee to a prospective employer of that employee, at the
quest of the prospective employer of that employee, may not be held civilly liable for the disclosure or the
nsequences of providing the information.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that an employer is acting in good faith when the employer
ovides information about the job performance, professional conduct, or evaluation of a former or current
iployee to a prospective employer of that employee, at the request of the prospective employer of that
lployee.
(3) The presumption of good faith is rebuttable only upon showing by clear and convincing evidence that
i employer disclosed the information with actual malice or with intent to mislead.
(4) For purposes of this section "actual malice" means knowledge that the information was false or
ddess disregard of whether the information was false.
(5) This section does not alter any privileges that exist under common law.
acted by Chapter 346, 1995 General Session
wnload Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34_14002.ZIP 2,158 Bytes
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AMENDMENT XIV
'asseel by Congress June 13, J 866. Ratified July 9. 1868.
Jote: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment.
ection 1.
ill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
Itates and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty7, or property, without
lue process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Jection 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
lumber of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when therightto vote at any election for the choice of
Sectors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
)fficers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
wenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
3r other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
:itizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member
of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
^Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment.

(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may refer to
the addendum of the appellant
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the
appellee may file a bnef in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal Reply briefs
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to
the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the
appellate court
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum
references to parties by such designations as "appellant* and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the designations used in
the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,"
"the injured person,' "the taxpayer," etc
(e) References in briefs to the record References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant
to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule
11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover
page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right comer and each separately numbered page(s) referred to
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit
numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected
(f) Length of briefs Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not
exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving crossappeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed
the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders
The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the
issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed
50 pages in length The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief The
appellant's second bnef shall not exceed 25 pages in length The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length which contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the
appellee/cross-appellant's first brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities,
and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good
cause shown
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases involving more than one appellant or appellee,
including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant
or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs
(I) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that
party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the
appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An
original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a reference either to the page of the
brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the
supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited
(j) Requirements and sanctions All briefs under this rule must be concise presented with accuracy, logically arranged with
proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immatenal or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in
compliance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer
Advisory Committee Note Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held See In re Beesley, 883
P2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) T o successfully appeal a trial
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty , the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists '" ONEIDA/SLIC, v ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc , 872
P2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App 1994) (alteration in onginal)(quoting West Valley City v Majestic Inv Co , 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah App 1991)) See also State ex rel M S v Salata, 806 P 2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App 1991), Bell v Elder 782
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App 1989), State v Moore, 802 P 2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App 1990)

U1C ^ H

Rule 24. Briefs
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropnate headings and in the order indicated
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties The list should be set out
on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references (a)(3) A table of authorities with
cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the
pages of the brief where they are cited
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority, and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the
appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent part of
the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule
(a)(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate bnefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and its disposition in the court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow All
statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule
(a)(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the
arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument
is arranged
(a)(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding A party seeking to recover attorney=s fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The addendum shall
be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum is bound separately, the
addendum shall contain a table of contents The addendum shall contain a copy of
(a)(11)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced
verbatim in the brief,
(a)(11)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, in all cases any court opinion of
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service, and
(a)(11)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction
(b) Brief of the appellee The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule except that
the appellee need not include
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant, or

The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of
supporting authority.

ADDENDUM B

U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service

INS Administrative Center, Twin Cities
1 Federal Drive, Room 400
Fort Smiling, MN 55111-4055

December 18, 2002
CSN: 02968985

S:\INS\SCL\7004
Mr. Jeffrey Dell Chryst
1078 Country Mile Dr.
Riverton, UT 84065

Dear Mr. Chryst:
This show cause letter is in reference to your application for an Immigrations Inspector position
with the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Under the
authority of section 5.2 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) conducted a background investigation to determine your current
suitability for employment in this position.
A. SUITABILITY ISSUES
The investigation revealed certain adverse information, allegations and incidents. Therefoie, under
the provisions of 5 CFR 731, we determined you are ineligible for an appointment as an
Immigrations Inspector, and you may be denied examination for, and appointment to, all, or
specific, positions within the INS for a period of not more than one year from the date of our
decision on the following grounds, individually or collectively:
(1) Misconduct or negligence in employment
(2) Criminal or dishonest conduct
Each of these allegations is a basis for disqualification from employment and will be discussed
separately.
Charge

1

: Misconduct or Negligence in Employment

• While employed with Weltmeister Incorporated, there were accounts of your misconduct and
negligence in following the rules of employment. You took an unauthorized four days vacation,
prior to quitting your job at Weltmeister in July of 2001. Also, you quit earlier than the two
weeks notice. You stated reasons for leaving Weltmeister as being a future 50% reduction in pay

Mr. Jeffrey Dell Chryst
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and a decrease in hours.
• A second instance of misconduct while employed with Weltmeister, Inc. is when you cleaned
out your desk at the time of separation from Weltmeister. You took with you company files that
were not to be taken out of the office, a breech of your signed employment contract. Your
employer then sent you a letter directing you to return the company files and you returned four or
five manila envelopes of information. A main file and project of yours, however, was not returned
when asked by the employer. Another letter was then sent, asking you to specifically send the file
containing the application project you were to have been working on throughout your last months
with Weltmeister. You returned this letter to your employer unopened and, as of August 2002,
you have not returned the project file to Weltmeister.
• An incident that shows your negligence while employed with Weltmeister is when you were
instructed by your supervisor to follow up on some accounts after you had submitted your
resignation from the company. You did not make one phone call to any of the accounts you were
told to call and, therefore, you neglected to do what you were told by your supervisor. Also,
coworkers and supervisors attested that you spent company time both on the telephone and on the
computer for personal reasons.
• You also showed neglect for the regulations of the company by sending a derogatory email about
your supervisor to the boss of the company in Germany. You stated in this email that your
supervisor was embezzling money and running the company into the ground. You also stated your
interest in the position of your supervisor, the Vice President.
Charge
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: Criminal or Dishonest Conduct

You have shown a pattern of dishonesty through the employment misconduct and negligence listed
in the above charge, as well as the instances that follow:
• On your Standard Form (SF) 86, certified true and correct by you on April 30, 2002, you were
asked to list your employment activities, beginning with the present and working back seven years
(to 1995). You listed only Weltmeister, Inc. and Wonderbread/Hostoss (Interstate Brands). You
failed to disclose employment with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, at which you
were employed from August 2001, to February 2002. You failed to list a second employer, SOS
Staffing, at which you were employed from March of 1995, to October of 1999. You were
followed up with a second PRSI on August 8, 2002, at which you stated a second time that you had
no other employments between 7/1995 and the present.
• There is information that shows your dishonesty in collection of unemployment benefits. You
collected $266 per week from August 1999, to October 1999. During October, Interstate Brands
(Hostess) claimed that you earned $110.00, which you did not report to the Department of
Workforce Services. You also earned $3,151.00 in the months from July through September at
Interstate Brands (Hostess), with the last payment being on August 28th, 1999. You began
collecting unemployment benefits on August 14, 1999, and continued to collect $266 for the weeks
ending August 21st and August 28th, while still employed and receiving pay. You received a
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pamphlet from the Department of Workforce Services that stated on the front, "-Important- to
ensure your ongoing eligibility, use this guide as needed. You will be held accountable for the
information contained within. Keep it in a safe place." Within this pamphlet was a portion
concerning fraudulent behavior. It stated that "examples of Fraud include failure to report
earnings while filing..." By failing to report your earnings while filing for unemployment benefits,
you were dishonest in your contract with the Department of Workforce Services.
B. CONCLUSION
The qualities of good judgment, honesty, trustworthiness, reliability, dependability,
professionalism, and integrity are critical for the Immigrations Inspector position. It is important
that persons who carry out the essential duties required of the position demonstrate that they
possess these qualities to a high degree in both their personal and professional lives. The above
information, allegations and incidents cast serious doubt on your suitability for this type of
position.
C. OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND
You are being afforded the opportunity "to make any comments or provide any explanation or
documentary evidence, including affidavits, to dispute these allegations. We will consider this
information in reaching a determination as to your current suitability for employment in the
competitive Federal service position sought.
You are not required to answer this letter. However, if you do not reply or we do not otherwise
hear from you within thirty (30) days from the date of our letter, the INS decision in your case will
be final on the basis of information on hand without farther comment or explanation from you.
Your reply should be sent to me at the following address:
FIPC-SAS-INS
PO Box 618
Boyers,PA 16018-0618
The information summarized under Part A-Suitability Issues is the only information, along with
any response or documents you furnish, that will form the basis for INS' final decision. However,
you may request a copy of the material relied upon in preparing this letter, if you believe you need
this material in order to respond. You may submit a written request to the address shown above
for the material within the 30-day response period. You may also fax your request for the material
to (724) 794-9498.
The authority to collect the information permitted by this letter is derived from one or more of the
following:
sections 5.2 and 5.3 of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations;
sections 1303 and 1304 of title 5, United States Code;
sections 8(b), 8(c) and 9(c) of Executive Order 10450;
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sections 2455 of title 42, United States Code;
sections 1434 and 2585 of title 22, Umted States Code.
Any new information you supply will be used along with that supplied previously and developed
through investigation to determine your fitness for employment in the Federal service or for the
other employment purposes, including a security clearance and an evaluation of qualifications,
suitability, and loyalty to the United States.
This information may be furnished to designated officers and employees of agencies and
departments of the Federal government for employment purposes, including a security clearance
determination, an access determination, and evaluation of qualifications, suitability, and loyalty to
the United States Government, and a determination regarding qualifications or suitability for
performing contractual service to the Federali government. The information may also be disclosed
to any agency of the Federal government having oversight for review with regard to OPM
activities, to the intelligence agencies of the Federal government, or to others having a bona fide
reason as published in the Federal Register.
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